The Labor Arbitration Process: 1943-1963 by Fleming, R. W.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 52 | Issue 4 Article 5
1964
The Labor Arbitration Process: 1943-1963
R. W. Fleming
University of Illinois
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law
Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Special Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky
Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fleming, R. W. (1964) "The Labor Arbitration Process: 1943-1963," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 52 : Iss. 4 , Article 5.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol52/iss4/5
Special Comment
By R. W. FLEmNG*
THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS: 1943-1963*
The year 1948, which appears in the title of this paper, is
symbolic rather than precise. One could just as well use any
year from 1941 to 1945, since the intention is simply to identify
the period of World War II from which modem labor arbitration
dates. Only the urge toward a neat package extending back from
1963, and the fact that the War Labor Board issued its policy
statement on arbitration in 1943, justify the choice of that year.
Two clearly identifiable trends in labor arbitration are dis-
cernible in the postwar years. One is the increasing use and
popularity of the process, and the other, interestingly enough, is
the increasing criticism of it. It is the purpose of this paper to
explore the nature of the criticism and reflect upon the reasons
for it.
It is a fact that grievance arbitration has enjoyed an enormous
growth since the late war, but it is not true that it was unknown
or even strictly limited before that time. The Anthracite Board
started functioning in 1903, and in the period between 1910 and
1915 arbitration was widely used in the apparel industry.' Not
many other contracts contained arbitration clauses even into the
1930's (the estimate is that it was somewhere between eight and
ten per cent2), but in 1941 the United States Conciliation Service
found that sixty-three per cent of the 1,200 agreements in its files
included arbitration as a final step in the grievance procedure,
3
and in 1942 the National Industrial Conference Board noted arbi-
tration in about three-fourths of the 163 contracts which it
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
** The assistance of Mrs. Leah Lee in preparing this paper is gratefully
acknowledged.
1 Slichter, Healy and Livernash, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on
Management 743 (1960).
1d. at 739.
3 Steelman, The Work of the U. S. Conciliation Service in Wartime Labor
Disputes, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 4961, 466 (1942).
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studied.4 The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that the figure
had increased to eighty-three per cent in 1949 and to eighty-nine
per cent in 1952.1 I am told that an as yet unpublished study by
the BLS will show that in 1961-62 approximately ninety-four per
cent of the agreements examined contained grievance arbitration
clauses. Arguably, the resort to grievance arbitration would have
continued almost as rapidly without the war and the prodding of
the WLB, but a side effect of the war was the training of men
who have ever since formed the cadre of the arbitration profes-
sion. Just how much the availability of this experienced core of
men whose talents were readily convertible to arbitration meant
in the postwar development of arbitration is hard to assess.
Despite its popularity and growth, arbitration has come under
increased criticism. In 1959, the I.U.D. Digest asked, "Why has a
process once cheap, prompt, and simple become expensive,
protracted, and legalistically complicated?"" Fortune echoed the
same line shortly thereafter,7 and in the pages of the Arbitration
Journal, published by the American Arbitration Association, have
appeared a number of editorials on the subject of costs8 and
"creeping legalism."9 Some of the criticisms were not as thought-
ful as they might have been and well-warranted replies came from
men of distinction in the profession.10 Nevertheless, only the ill-
informed would insist that all of the criticism was wholly without
merit. Indeed, students of the administrative process could hardly
help but detect a familiar ring in much that was said. In the
early years of the century proponents of workmen's compensation
laws were sure that such statutes would, by withdrawing work
injury cases from the courts, thereafter insure an inexpensive,
expeditious, and informal procedure. But by 1953 one of the fore-
most students of that subject would write:
The evidence is clear that workmen's compensation has left
unfulfilled most of its major original objectives."
410 LRBM 1210 (1942).
5 Moore and Nix, Arbitration Provisions in Collective Agreements, 1952
Monthly Labor Rev. 261-266 (March, 1953).6 Our Avaricious Arbitrators, 4 I.U.D. Digest 108 (1959).
759 Fortune 199 (April, 1959).
814 Arb. J. (n.s.) 1 (1959), and 14 Arb. J. (n.s.) 113 (1959).
9 13 Arb. J. (n.s.) 129 (1958).
' 0 Aaron, Labor Arbitration and its Critics, 10 Lab. L.J. 605 (1959); and
Goldberg, Labor Arbitration-A Dedicated Calling, 4 I.U.D. Digest 126 (1959).
11 Herman A. and Anne Somers, Workmen's Compensation: Unfulfilled Prom-
iso, 7 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 82, 83 (1953).
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• ..advances have been made at the expense of increasing
complexity, ambiguity, litigiousness, and costliness in the
whole process .... 12
The bulk of the complaints about arbitration with respect to
cost, time-lag, and increased formality are coming from labor
sources, though this is not universally true. Management people
are more inclined to complain that arbitrators are increasingly
invading the privileged management sanctum. This is not a new
concern on their part; it was one of the arguments with which
proponents of arbitration had been forced to deal from the out-
set. 3 But there are some new aspects of the problem, to be dis-
cussed more fully later, about which management is understand-
ably troubled.
Let us then inquire a little more fully into these two major
lines of criticism in an effort to better understand where we are,
where we seem to be going, and whether we ought, in some
studied fashion, to try and change the direction somewhat.
I. Tim COST, Tam-LAG, FoRmALrry PROBLEM
The complaint is that arbitration has become more costly, less
prompt, and more burdened with unnecessary 'legalisms." We
are not wholly without information on these subjects. In 1957,
the American Arbitration Association published a comprehensive
statistical breakdown on these subjects in its journal.'4 And in
1958, Arthur Ross conducted a survey which documented the
conclusion that grievances were not receiving as prompt treat-
ment as they once had. 15
In the hope that some new light could be shed on the problem
a new survey was undertaken for purposes of this paper. Obvi-
ously, if one wants to know in 1963 whether arbitration is now
more costly, less expeditious, and more legalistic he must make a
comparison with previous periods. This is possible by going to
the files of either the American Arbitration Association or the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. From that point on
12 rbid.
13 Freidin and Ulman, Arbitration and the War Labor Board, 58 Harv. L. Rev.
809, 846 (1945).
1412 Arb. I. (n.s.) 67 (1957).
15 Ross, The Well-Aged Arbitration Case, 11 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 262(1958).
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the problem is unfortunately much more difficult. If one simply
takes a random sample of the cases he runs into the immediate
question of whether comparable issues are involved. This might
not be insurmountable if it could be assumed that in all periods
the spectrum of cases would be the same. The problem would
then presumably simply be one of properly devising the sample
so that it would be statistically meaningful. But no one thinks
the spectrum is the same, and this can be documented in a loose
sense by looking through the labor arbitration volumes published
by the Bureau of National Affairs. Volume 1, covering the period
1944 to 1946, includes no cases involving subcontracting, transfer
of jobs out of the unit, racial discrimination, or integration of
seniority lists. Volume 24, published in the year 1955, offers cases
on all of the above issues. Volume 88, containing 1962 decisions,
includes all of the things mentioned above but also adds decisions
on the appropriate unit, plant removals, supplementary unem-
ployment benefits, technological displacement allowances, and
damages for failure to do assigned work. Admittedly this is a
highly unscientific sample, but it has an inherent logic flowing
from the fact that some of the issues reported in the later volumes
can be tied to known bargaining results which were not in
existence at the earlier period.
To eliminate (insofar as possible) the variable arising out of
trying to compare cases which involve different issues we chose
to look only at discharge cases. We did this on the theory that
a discharge case was a discharge case, whether tried in 1945,
1955, or 1965. One can think of various reasons why this assump-
tion may be in error, but none of them seems of sufficient im-
portance to offset the advantages of taking a single important
issue which has remained much the same.
With the permission of the Federal Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service we took from the files 100 discharge cases decided in
1951-52 (the first year in which complete files were available),
100 cases decided in 1956-57, and a third 100 cases decided in
1962-68. From these files was obtained certain common informa-
tion. How long did the hearing take? How many study days did
a decision require? What was the arbitrator's per diem? What
was the arbitrator's total charge? Did counsel represent the
parties? What was the time-lag between the appointment of the
[Vol. 52,
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arbitrator and the date of the decision? (No other time dimension
is readily available in the FMCS files).
With this information we were able to make certain com-
parisons which are set forth in the charts which accompany this
paper. But the data is subject to some rather severe limitations
which need to be set forth at the very outset.
With the passage of time, certain arbitrators have established
such a high degree of acceptability that they can no longer permit
their names to appear on the FMCS roster, simply because they
do not have time to hear cases if they are chosen. It is probably
true that this group of arbitrators has a higher per diem rate than
many of those who are on the FMCS roster. It does not neces-
sarily follow that their total fees are higher because with their
greater experience they may work faster. Time-lag may be a
greater problem with such arbitrators because they are so heavily
occupied.
The information on time-lag which is obtainable from the
FMCS fies is inadequate in at least two respects. In the first
place, it is universally assumed that discharge cases are decided
more quickly than others because of back-pay implications, and
secondly, the fies only show time from the date of appointment
to the date of decision. Delay in handling the grievance up to the
time an arbitrator was appointed does not appear. What emerges,
therefore, is a comparison of one aspect of time-lag within a single
category of cases. Beyond that, one must speculate as to whether
it represents what is happening in other areas.
"Creeping legalisms" in the arbitration process are identifiable
from the files only in the sense that such tactics can be associated
with the presence of lawyers in the case. Many people-perhaps
including most arbitrators-think that a lawyer who understands
the nuances of the labor-management relationship renders a great
service in clarifying and expediting the hearing process. Others
feel quite the contrary. All we can do is show the extent to which
lawyers are representing the parties.
Despite the reservations with which one must present data of
this kind, it is, we believe, "interesting."
Length of the Hearing
Chart I shows the length of hearings in discharge cases for
three different periods from 1951 to 1963. One need study it
1964]
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only briefly to see that there has been very little change. There
is an insignificant variation in the number of hearings which took
less than one day. There are a few more cases in 1956 and 1963
than in 1951 which took one day to hear, but on the other hand
there were more cases in 1951 which took a day-and-a-half to
hear. If the two are balanced together one suspects that differ-
ences are easily accounted for by the nature of the sample.
Those hearings which took more than one day tend to be about
the same over the balance of the chart. It happened that in our
sample there were no cases in 1951 which took two-and-one-half
days, but there were more in that year than in either 1956 or
1968, which took three days.
If the information is reliable, it leads to two firm conclusions:
(1) the overwhelming bulk of the discharge cases are heard in
one day, and (2) the passage of time has neither lengthened nor
shortened the discharge hearing.
75
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65 Discharge cases* - L Legend
1951-52
60 1956-57 M
1962-63 EM
55
50
45
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Lawyer Participation in Cases
Since the number of hearing days required for a discharge
case has not changed noticeably since 1951, the way could be
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opened for some judgment as to the role which lawyers are
playing. Either they are present no more frequently than they
once were, or their presence does not noticeably affect the length
of the proceeding.
Unfortunately, it is not easy to tell from the FMCS files
whether counsel represented the parties. Nothing in the office
files requires such a notation and only if the arbitrator lists the
appearances can one tell. Accordingly, we were able to tell in
only fifty-eight of the 100 cases chosen for the year 1951-52
whether counsel were present, and in 1956-57 and 1962-63 the
figures were seventy-six and seventy-five respectively. Subject to
those limitations, the results are as follows:
1951-52 1956-57 1962-63
Cases in which
there were no counsel 21% 34% 40%
Cases in which both
parties were represented 31% 22% 32%
Cases in which the company
only was represented 36% 37% 25%
Cases in which the union
only was represented 12% 7% 3%
Total cases in which the
company was represented 67% 59% 57%
Total cases in which the
union was represented 43% 29% 85%
Some of the above statistics accord with the predictions which
an experienced observer might make, but others do not.'6 It is
commonly accepted that companies are more frequently repre-
sented by counsel than are unions and the figures show this to
be true. It is not often that the union has counsel, but the com-
pany does not, and this too emerges from the statistics. What
may be surprising is that there is no evidence that the use of
lawyers is increasing, and as a matter of fact, this sample would
lead to a contrary conclusion. The figures are tricky because the
size of the sample changes, although it is about the same for the
years 1956-57 and 1962-63. If one cannot say for sure that lawyers
16 Ross, supra note 14, at 72.
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are being used less frequently, he certainly cannot say that they
are being used more frequently.
Study Days
Chart II shows the number of study days which arbitrators
used in preparing a decision in discharge cases at three different
periods between 1951 and 1963. It is interesting to compare this
with Chart I because hearing days have remained relatively static
while study days show some upward movement. In 1951 about
twenty per cent of the cases were decided with less than a day
of study time, while in 1956 the figure was nine per cent, and in
1963 it was only eight per cent. The number of cases in all three
periods requiring one day of study remained relatively the same.
In those cases requiring more than one day, but less than two,
1951 and 1963 are not far apart, but 1956 climbed above both.
However, the number of cases is not significant and may well be
accounted for by the small size of the sample. Cases requiring
two days of study have shown a steady upward trend from 1951
to 1963, although once again the movement is slight. The remain-
ing data simply demonstrates that few cases require more than
two days of study.
Conclusions from this data are tentative, but they would seem
to indicate that there is a drift away from less than a day of study
for the decision in any case, and that there is a slight upward
drift in the number of days, up to two, which are charged for
preparing the decision. Beyond two days there is no discernible
trend.
Per Diem Rates and Total Fees of Arbitrators
Charts III and IV show per diem rates and total fees of
arbitrators for the cases in question. Chart III indicates that in
1951-52 over half of the arbitrators were charging less than 100
dollars per day. Practically all of the others were listed at an even
100 dollars. In a relatively few cases the rate was a bit higher
than 100 dollars.
By contrast, in 1956-57 less than ten per cent of the arbitrators
charged less than 100 dollars per day. Approximately fifty-eight
per cent had a per diem rate of 100 dollars, almost eighteen per
cent charged 125 dollars, and fourteen per cent charged 150
dollars. In 1962-63, the rate had moved up so that no one charged
[Vol. 59.,
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less than 100 dollars, twenty-four per cent were charging a flat
100 dollars, thirty-eight per cent had a fee of 125 dollars, and
thirty per cent worked for 150 dollars per day.
If one calculates the average rate for the respective periods
he finds that it was 84 dollars in 1951-52, 110 dollars in 1956-57,
and 129 dollars in 1962-63. The percentage increase between the
first and the last periods would then be fifty-four per cent.
Oddly enough, this is almost the same as the rise in average
hourly earnings of production workers in manufacturing during
the same period. Bureau of Labor Statistics figures show that
when one excludes overtime the average hourly earnings of
production workers in manufacturing between July 1, 1951, and
July 1, 1952, were 1.55 dollars. For the period from July 1, 1962,
to July 1, 1963, the same average jumped to 2.34 dollars. The
difference is seventy-nine cents, and this, rounded to the nearest
percentage, is fifty-one per cent more than workers were receiving
in 1951-52.
Chart IV shows total fees for arbitrators in each of the three
periods. What it does not show, but what one can derive from it
by calculating averages, is that average total fees have not risen
by the same percentage as have per diem fees. Thus the average
KENTUCKY LAw JouRNAL [Vol. 52,
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fee in 1951-52 was 277 dollars, and the average fee in 1962-63 was
402 dollars. The percentage difference is forty-six per cent, as
contrasted with a fifty-four per cent rise in per diem fees, and a
fifty-one per cent rise in average hourly earnings of production
workers in manufacturing. Thus the average total fee in 1956-57
was six per cent less than the rise in the per diem fee. In both
cases this would suggest that arbitrators raised their per diem
fees but cut back on their study days. This conclusion would
appear to be in conflict with the chart which shows a slight rise
in study days. The explanation may be that those arbitrators
with higher per diem fees charge fewer study days.
Averages are of course deceptive and the above comparison
has no great value except to point up the fact that in this sample
arbitrators fees have gone up but not to an inordinate degree.
The Time-Lag Problem
For reasons already indicated the time-lag data gathered in
the course of studying these discharge files has very limited use-
fulness. It does show, however, that even in discharge cases it
took about two weeks longer in 1962-63 to get a case decided,
after appointment of the arbitrator, than in 1951-52. In this sense
it confirms the disturbing evidence presented in Arthur Ross'
earlier and much more comprehensive survey.17 Grievance de-
cisions through arbitration are not as prompt as they once were.
Chart V, which is a graph of time-lag in these cases shows a
curious rhythm in the issuance of awards. Offhand, one would
expect the line to rise to a peak, at which time the bulk of the
decisions would be issued, and then gradually decline again to
zero. On the contrary, there is a series of peaks and valleys dur-
ing each of the periods under study and they correspond remark-
ably well. This can probably be explained by known variables
which have to do with the award process. Many cases do not
involve transcripts or post hearing briefs. In that event, the issue
is ripe for decision as soon as the hearing is over. If briefs are to
be submitted, but there is no transcript, there will be some delay
while briefs are written. If there was a transcript and briefs are
to be written after the transcript is made available, there will be
a further delay. At the actual decision stage it may be true that
17 Ross, supra note 15.
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a tripartite board will be involved. In such cases, the neutral
chairman often prepares a decision which is distributed to the
board members prior to an executive session. Convening the
board requires additional time. It is probable that the peaks and
valleys shown in the graph represent variations of the above
process.
If the above explanation of the rhythm of discharge decisions
is valid, it serves as a useful reminder to the parties that speed
in getting a decision will vary directly with their insistence upon
a transcript and briefs, or a tripartite board. This does not neces-
sarily lead to a conclusion that transcripts, briefs, and boards
should be abandoned. It does mean, however, that the parties
must frequently make a choice. Which do they prefer, speed or
certain kinds of procedures?
35 Chart 
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II. THE MANAGEMENT RIGHTs PROBLEM
For perfectly understandable reasons, management has always
been concerned about its right to make and execute decisions
which may determine the efficiency and profitability of the enter-
prise. When arbitration first appeared on the horizon, manage-
ment had to decide whether it was willing to submit to third
[Vol. 52 ,
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party decision any area having to do with the conduct of the
business. Encouraged by such powerful corporations as General
Motors, a trend toward submission of issues arising out of dis-
agreements over the meaning and interpretation of contracts
developed.18 But in recent years management has become in-
creasingly concerned about "implied" restrictions which arbi-
trators find in contract clauses. In a recent article dealing with
implied restrictions on work movement, a leading management
lawyer reached the following conclusion:
... arbitrartors who imply restrictions on "work movements"
are doing the institution of arbitration irreparable harm. Such
restrictions come as a surprise to the management negotiators
and diminish managements ability to hold down costs. Man-
agements, who are under pressure from all persons interested
in the enterprise to operate plants effectively, will reject
arbitration as the process to be relied upon to resolve disputes
over contract interpretation if such surprise results become
characteristic. Only if the simple and straightforward view,
that managements retain all rights to manage unless they
have agreed to limit these rights, is adopted generally, can
thoughtful managements support this important institution.19
The trouble is that collective bargaining contracts, like other
social compacts, take on the coloration of the times. The meaning
which the parties will seek to inject into contract language will
be a function of the pressures which exist as of that moment on
the union and on the management.
The context of collective bargaining has changed greatly in
the last ten or fifteen years. Union strongholds in manufacturing
have been undermined by a new technology which not only
requires fewer people but often moves the old blue collar worker
out of the production unit and into a white collar job. In the
decade of the 1950's, total employment in production increased
by nine per cent while production went up forty-three per cent.
Even this comparison is deceptive because most of the increase
in employment came in administration, sales, and engineering
categories so that there was a net drop in the number of produc-
tion employees. A clear reflection of this is contained in the recent
Is Alexander, Impartial Umpireships: The General Motors-UAW Experience,
in National Academy of Arbitrators, Arbitration and the Law, Proceedings of the
12th Annual Meeting 116 (McKelvey ed. 1959).
19 Fairweather, Implied Restrictions on ork Movements-The Pernicious
Crow of Labor Contract Construction, 38 Notre Dame Law. 518, 554 (1963).
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study released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics showing that
union membership had dropped by almost half a million since
1960.20
The new technology is often, though not always, accompanied
by another phenomenon. Labor's historic weapon, the strike, is
in some industries almost obsolete. The long dispute in the Shell
Refineries in New Orleans during the past year demonstrated
conclusively that supervisory personnel can keep a plant of that
kind going at near capacity despite the complete and continued
absence of production workers. And in the telephone industry
it is a well-known fact that a very lengthy strike can be absorbed
without a breakdown in service. If, as Mr. Justice Douglas said in
the Lincoln-Mills case, "the agreement to arbitrate grievance dis-
putes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike," some
managements may no longer have the same incentive to include an
arbitration clause.2'
Finally, with the passage of the lush war years, management
has undeniably been pressed harder on the cost front. Foreign
policy commitments require that American markets be opened
as never before to foreign competition, and in those industries in
which labor represents a significant cost factor management is
under great pressure to find ways and means of cutting back.
Given these facts of life, unions have sought in recent years
to exploit new possibilities in the collective bargaining relation-
ship. This drive is reflected in NLBB proceedings, before the
courts, and in arbitration. There is presently a great furor over
whether management is required by law to bargain with unions
over such subjects as the closing of plants or the subcontracting
of work. In general, the NLRB has been holding that there is
such a requirement,2 but the circuit courts are less certain.3
Before long we will doubtless have a Supreme Court decision on
the point. Meanwhile, management lawyers are expressing great
concern about the path that the Board is pursuing. 4
20 54 LRR 895 (Dec. 16, 1963).
2 1 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 358 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
22 Cf., Fibreboard Products Corp., 138 NLRB No. 67 (1962), Town and
Country Mfg. Co., 186 NLRB No. 111 (1962), Hawaii Meat Co. Ltd., 189 NLRB
No. 75 (1962), Darlington Mfg. Co., 189 NLRB No. 23 (1962).2 3 Cf., Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 54 LRRM 2499 (4th Cir. 1963), and
NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 54 LRRM 2171 (8th Cir. 1968).
24 54 LRR 185 (Oct. 11, 1963); Livingston, The Changing Duty to Bargain,
14 Lab. L.J. 304 (1963).
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While the Board has been debating managements duty to
bargain about plant closings, Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act
has permitted probing actions in the federal courts designed to
interpret collective bargaining contracts. The Glidden case,25
with its doctrine of vested seniority rights, raised all sorts of new
possibilities. And the Webster Electric case,26 enjoining subcon-
tracting of janitorial work on the ground that it violated the union
security clause, certainly suggested to the unions that the courts
might be a better source of new law than the arbitrators.
Considerations of employee security, which were largely
behind the NLRB and court actions described above, naturally
furnished the stimulus for many arbitration cases involving such
things as subcontracting, plant removals, employment rights in
other company plants, etc2 And, as one would expect, it was not
possible to seal off Board or court actions to avoid spill-over into
another area. The Glidden case had hardly been decided by the
second circuit before vested seniority rights were being argued
before arbitrators. 29 The same thing was true of the National
Labor Relations Board's ruling adding six per cent interest to
back pay awards. 30
From managements point of view, this three-pronged attack
on its rights through different tribunals spells real danger for the
future. To make matters worse, the arguments being made by the
unions are often backed by appealing human considerations. In
a time of high unemployment no one derives any pleasure from
seeing plants close or move, from seeing workers with many years
of service displaced, or from seeing standards undercut through
the subcontracting device. The generally favorable reception
given the recent railway arbitration award3' which permitted
only gradual elimination of jobs no longer needed was another
indication that the public had great sympathy for the cause of
workers caught in a machine society.
25Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), affd on other grounds,
370 U.S. 530 (1962).
26 Local 891, UAW v. Webster Elec. Co., 299 F.2d 195 (7th Cr. 1962).27 Fleming, Some Observations on Contract Grievances Before Courts and
Arbitrators, 15 Stan. L. Rev. 595, 613 (1963).
28 Fleming, supra note 19.2 9 United Packers, Inc., 38 Lab. Arb. 619 (1962); H. H. Robertson Co. 37
Lab. Arb. 928 (1962).30 Hampton Corp., 39 L. A. 177 (1962), American Chain and Cable Co., 40
L. A. 312 (1963).1l Railroads v. Operating Brotherhoods, 41 L. A. 673 (1963).
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There is nothing management can do to control the outcome
of pending NLRB cases, but the lesson of the court and arbitra-
tion cases is being read to mean that managements must hence-
forth be more careful about the content of the collective agree-
ment and the impact of third-party decisions. This will create
additional tensions in collective bargaining. The arbitration clause
was widely reported to be the toughest hurdle to a new agree-
ment between General Electric and the IUE in their recent
bargaining, and the contract which emerged gave clear evidence
of the company's concern about the power and jurisdiction of the
arbitrator.
Some Institutional Factors
In considering criticism of the arbitration process, too little
attention is given to two factors which are at the root of much
of the difficulty. The first is the plain but simple fact that labor
and management do not share a completely common interest in
the arbitration device, and the second is that events beyond
their control may conditions their approach to arbitration. Both
of these factors require some explanation.
With relatively minor exceptions, the accepted pattern of
conduct under a collective bargaining contract in the United
States is for the company to retain the initiative, subject to com-
plaints on the part of the union that the contract has been vio-
lated. This has the effect of putting the company continually on
the defensive. For that very reason, the company will prefer as
tightly drawn a contract as the union will agree to, and a clause
limiting the power of the arbitrator to interfere with manage-
ment's conduct of its business. The union's outlook is inherently
different. By and large it stands to gain from a loose contract
with maximum flexibility in the arbitrator. The kind of contract
which is ultimately signed, including the arbitration clause and
the authority which it gives to the arbitrator, is the product of
bargaining. Once the contract is in effect, the hopes and the
aspirations of the parties relate back to their bargaining objec-
tives. Success on the part of one in arbitration may mean disap-
pointment on the part of the other. Human nature being what it
is the blame tends to fall on the arbitration process, though the
crux of the problem may simply be that the parties were not able
[Vol. 52,
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to agree in bargaining on what they wanted and both ended up
taking a chance.
Even when the parties see eye to eye on the collective con-
tract and the role which arbitration is to play in interpreting it,
events often force one or both of the parties into a somewhat
different posture. Take the case of the company that has gone
along for years arbitrating discipline, discharge, seniority, and
classification cases. A changing economy then causes it to build
a new and more efficient plant elsewhere, or to consider sub-
contracting a part of its operation. High unemployment and
intense job security consciousness then cause the union to argue
that the recognition clause in the contract (or some other clause)
prohibits the company from displacing old employees who are
covered by the agreement. The resulting arbitration may well
raise issues of an entirely new dimension so far as the company
is concerned. A discipline case could be submitted with relative
calm and a minimum of formality, but a subcontracting or vesting
of seniority rights issue may seem to the company to challenge
its very existence. The result may well be defense in depth-
refusal to arbitrate, formidable legal talent on the company's side
both in court and in the eventual arbitration if there is one, full
scale transcripts, post-hearing briefs, etc. The decision may drag
out over a long period of time. To the union and its members the
whole arbitration process may seem suddenly to have become
very costly, time consuming, and legalistic. From the company s
standpoint its new posture has been determined by having to
defend itself in a much more critical area than ever before.
If events change the climate of arbitration for companies, the
same thing is true for unions. Union lawyers are widely reported
to feel that since the Landrum-Griffin Act they have been forced
into taking to arbitration many grievances which would previously
have been disposed of at an earlier stage of the grievance pro-
cedure. Now, under pressure of a possible claim that the union
has not fairly represented the individual grievant, the union takes
the case to arbitration. If, as counsel seem to feel, these cases
tend to be less meritorious, the end result is that the union finds
itself spending more money than before on arbitration with less
to show for it.
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Some Possible Alternatives
Man-made institutions are rarely perfect, and when the prob-
lem area is one in which there are strong conflicting interests the
difficulties are multiplied. In evaluating private grievance arbitra-
tion, it is well to remember that it is not the only available
alternative. Indeed, we have some experience with several other
ways of resolving such disputes.
There are periodic rumblings to the effect that grievance
arbitration ought to be abandoned in favor of good old slow-
down, strike, and lockout methods, but it seems unlikely that this
will develop into a popular movement. One important reason is
that neither side has retained much of its earlier enthusiasm for
such methods, and both are aware that the public has come to
expect better of them than the law of the jungle.
A different approach to contract disputes is taken under the
Railway Labor Act where tripartite boards hear and resolve
grievances under governmental sponsorship. This system once
worked fairly well, but it has been severely criticized in recent
years because its backlog of cases includes many that are as much
as six years old.32 Decisions from private arbitrators, however
long delayed, look like instant justice as compared with the
railway boards.
For a brief period after the war, the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service supplied free arbitration services to labor
and management, and the states of New York and Wisconsin
still do, though with certain restrictions. It is not very probable
that there will be a trend in this direction, because there is no
disposition on the part of the government to undertake the
expense.
If dissatisfaction with the present system of private arbitration
should become serious, it is more probable that serious considera-
tion would be given to a system of labor courts, such as one finds
in many Western European countries, than to any of the other
alternatives. It can be argued that such a system would dispose
of the now difficult and sensitive problem of whether an individual
is entitled to go to arbitration without the support, or even over
32 The Public Interest in National Labor Policy, Committee for Economic
Development 60 (1961).
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the opposition of, his union.m We know relatively little about
comparative operation of foreign labor courts, and it may be that
an extensive investigation is now warranted.
Summary and Conclusions
Labor arbitration is being severely criticised by unions on the
ground that it is no longer inexpensive, informal, and expeditious,
and by management on the ground that arbitrators are increas-
ingly invading critical areas of management rights.
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service data comparing
discharge cases tried in 1951, 1956, and 1962 show:
1. That the number of days required to hear such a case has
not materially changed over that period of time.
2. That there is a slight, but not strong, trend upward in
the amount of study time required by arbitrators to decide such
cases.
3. That the per diem charges of arbitrators have gone up in
about the same amount as average hourly earnings in manu-
facturing since 1951.
4. That total fees charged by arbitrators have gone up some-
what less than would be indicated by the change in per diem fees.
5. That decisions are now somewhat slower in coming down
than they once were.
A legitimate question arises as to whether these data fairly
represent the arbitration picture today. My own conclusion is
that they probably do if one considers only those kinds of cases
to which we have all grown accustomed over the years, e.g.,
discipline and discharge, seniority, job classification, etc. New
and complex issues growing out of the emphasis upon job security
may fall into quite a different pattern.
Union attempts to further invade the management prerogative
are, in the foregoing analysis, treated as the inevitable product
of a period in which vast changes are taking place in our indus-
trial society and in which job security is at a premium. Manage-
ment's response is likely to be increased attention to the language
of the collective bargaining contract and to the authority of the
33 Cf., Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 53 LRRM 2271 (1963), and see Sum-
sers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements-A Preliminary Analysis, in N.Y.U.
Twelfth Annual Conference on Labor 63 (1959).
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arbitrator. This will create additional tensions within bargaining
and perhaps contribute to some dissatisfaction on the part of both
labor and management with the arbitration process.
Finally, it has been suggested that at the root of some of the
present dissatisfaction with the arbitration process is the fact that
labor and management do not have entirely common objectives
with respect to the use of arbitration, and even when they do
events often cause them to use the machinery in an unanticipated
manner.
In their keen analysis of the frustrations which proponents of
workmens' compensation feel as they look at the results of their
earlier efforts, Herman and Anne Somers have observed:
Social legislation requires continuous revision to keep it abreast
of a changing environment, and it requires administrative ar-
rangements adequate for its purposes. Lacking these, all the
virtues attributable to the original intention will not prevent
is distortion or decay.3
4
The essense of what has been said in this paper is that private
grievance arbitration, like the social legislation of which the
Somers' speak, "requires continuous revision to keep it abreast of
a changing environment." The climate in which arbitration takes
place will continually change because we live in a dynamic
society. Arbitration is now being asked to do some things and to
resolve some issues which at an earlier date did not much figure
in the thinking of the parties. Events which are beyond the
control of the parties have forced them to modify their strategies
and approaches.
Criticism is healthy. It draws attention to problem areas.
Arbitration does not exist for the care and maintenance of
arbitrators. It exists because it has in the past filled a felt need
on the part of labor and management. It will continue to exist
so long as this is true. And it will remain true if unions, com-
panies, and arbitrators are open-minded about change, frank in
exploring deficiencies with one another, and imaginative in work-
ing out new and improved procedures.
34 Summers, supra note 11, at 32.
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